In re DeShaun M. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1348 DeShaun appeared for his jurisdictional hearing in physical restraints, including leg restraints and a waist chain attached to both of his arms. His attorney requested that the restraints be removed. The court would only permit DeShaun’s right arm to be freed, so that he could write. The court sustained an allegation that DeShaun committed a robbery. On appeal, DeShaun contends that the use of physical restraints was improper and violated his rights. The Court of Appeal agrees that the use of physical restraints was unwarranted but upheld the sustained petition. The court finds that juveniles can be shackled during adjudication hearings on a lesser showing than is required for adults because there is no jury. Here, the juvenile court made no findings regarding the necessity of using physical restraints. The error was deemed harmless because there was no indication that the restraints were visible to the witnesses and had affected their testimony or that the minor’s ability to communicate with counsel and testify was adversely affected.

Tiffany A. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1344 This juvenile court had a practice and policy to put ankle shackles on all detained minors who appear in the courtroom for all proceedings. This policy was adopted because of the number of unlocked exits and unsecured hallways in the courtroom and because of the lack of sheriff’s personnel available to monitor the facility. Tiffany objected to being shackled with leg chains and requested they be removed. The court denied the request. Later, Tiffany filed a motion asking the court to make an order prohibiting the sheriff from using such physical restraints, unless the shackling had been ordered by the court based on an individualized evidentiary showing of need. The juvenile court denied the request citing the inadequacy of the court facilities and the absence of possible jury prejudice. The Court of Appeal held the use of physical restraints upon minors must be based on the nonconforming conduct and behavior of that individual minor. Juveniles cannot be shackled at any hearing without a showing specific to each juvenile. The adult shackling rules apply equally to juveniles. Even where there is no jury, some showing of need for the shackling is required. That showing can be less than the showing required at a jury trial, but that showing must be specific to each individual minor. Irrespective of the type of proceeding, only the conduct of an individual defendant can justify restraints. No California case has endorsed shackling based on the person being in custody, the lack of courtroom personnel, or the inadequacy of court facilities.

In re Anthony P. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 502 Prejudicial error per se to deny defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine alleged victim in battery/sexual molestation case by means of hypothetical questions relating to her prejudice against blacks. Here, cross-examination was crucial since this was a credibility contest between the alleged victim and the minor.

Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 Statements by minor to probation officer or court for fitness hearing purposes may not be used in the prosecution's subsequent case-in-chief at trial or adjudication.

In re Jesse G. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 724 A referee who takes on the role of both judge and advocate in a contested juvenile court proceeding, by presenting and questioning the sole witness and then adjudicating the minor's status, acts in violation of the minor’s constitutional right to procedural due process.

In re James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810 Failure to object to judge hearing the adjudication after having heard the fitness hearing constitutes a waiver.

In re Mario G. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 1060 Same judge who heard detention hearing also heard the adjudication. The district attorney said he had no witnesses. The trial court said it could rely on the transcript of the detention hearing. Okay to do but since it is tantamount to a submission on the transcript, express waivers under Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, are required.

In re James H. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 268 District attorney needs not prove minor’s age to confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court.

In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249 Reversible error to prevent defense attorney from arguing in final argument.

In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718 During adjudication the minor made a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence at the close of the People’s case (WIC § 701.1). The motion was denied. The minor then testified as part of the defense and provided additional evidence that assisted the People’s case. The appellate court reversed. The People’s case was insufficient and the motion to dismiss should have been granted. The fact that the minor testified after the denial of the motion and his testimony supplied the deficiency in the prosecution’s case does not result in waiver.

In re Edy D. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1199 The court denied § 725(a) supervision as a disposition because Edy had “inconvenienced” the witnesses by going to trial. Edy was made a ward of the court and placed home on probation. The Court of Appeal reversed. It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is a due process violation. A court may not offer any inducement in return for a guilty plea or nolo contendere. It may not treat a defendant more leniently because he foregoes his right to trial or more harshly because he exercises that right.

In re James P. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 435 Failure to object at disposition hearing that disposition hearing be conducted by same judge who took plea, may imply that same judge was not an implied term of the plea bargain. Record must demonstrate a reasonable basis for which minor could expect same judge. (See People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749.)

In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 No error in court’s failure to secure minor's personal waiver of right to have dispositional hearing in front of judge who heard admission where the minor was advised of his right and failed to object. Also, the minor's attorney waived Arbuckle here, and there was no reasonable expectation of sentencing by the same judge since the case was thereupon transferred to the minor's home county for disposition.

In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 Extends Arbuckle principle to juvenile proceedings, that an implied term of plea bargain is that the judge hearing the plea will impose sentence. Arbuckle error entitles the minor to a new disposition hearing in front of the original judge or to a withdrawal of the admission.

In re Thomas S. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 934 Minor should be advised of right to have judge who took admission hear disposition, but Arbuckle advisement is not mandatory. The right may be waived by acquiescence or other conduct indicating waiver.

In re Kenneth H. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 143 In delinquency proceedings in which the minor was charged with cruelty to animals, the minor and his counsel entered into an agreement with the prosecutor that if the minor passed a polygraph examination the prosecution would dismiss the case. The minor passed the test, but the prosecution reneged on the agreement. The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that the prosecution was bound by the agreement and was required to move to dismiss the after the minor took and passed the polygraph test.

In re Regina N. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 577 Written waiver forms are not sufficient in juvenile court. Minors must make express, personal waiver of rights.

In re Abdul Y. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 847 Minor may file CCP § 170.6 affidavit, but not in this case because court had already made a factual determination bearing on the minor’s guilt.

Daniel V. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 28 A Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6 peremptory challenge is generally timely so long as it’s filed before commencement of the hearing at issue. An exception exists if the matter is assigned to an all purpose court. An all-purpose assignment court assignment requires a party to file a § 170.6 challenge within 10 days from that assignment. In this case the juvenile court claimed that there was an informal rule that cases were assigned for all purposes. The Court of Appeal held the challenge was timely. Unless a court adopts a formal rule, there’s an all-purpose assignment only when the court actually announces that the assignment is for all purposes.

Antonio G. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 422 Filing a peremptory challenge (CCP § 170.6) prior to a hearing on a probation violation is improper when the same judge presided at the original disposition.

In re Henry C. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 646 CCP § 170(a)(5) encompasses bias and prejudice of the court against witnesses as well against a party or his counsel. Here a judge was duty-bound to declare a mistrial once it stated that it had preconceived notions as to the credibility of certain witnesses. Note: CCP §170 has been amended since 1984.

In re Christian J. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 276 Where the juvenile judge improperly denied the People’s timely CCP § 170.6 affidavit but the minor’s counsel acquiesced in that judge hearing the case, the minor could not complain on appeal as to the denial of the People's challenge. The minor did not need to use his own CCP § 170.6 affidavit, but should have objected in order to become a “party beneficially interested”to contest the issue on appeal.

In re Johnny R. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1579 Johnny was charged with one count of assault with a deadly weapon in juvenile court. Midway through the proceedings, the prosecutor amended the petition and added an additional count of possession of a dirk or dagger. The court dismissed the first count at the end of the trial, but found the second count to be true. Johnny appeals the true finding, claiming that the amendment to the petition placed him in double jeopardy and violated his due process rights. The appellate court reversed the true finding because the juvenile court erred in allowing the amendment to the petition. Although the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy applies to juvenile delinquency hearings, it is not an issue in this case because Johnny was only on trial one time and the added offense was different from the first. However, allowing the amended petition to be entered midway through the trial was reversible error. There is no evidence that the prosecutor had considered the second offense until after the judge had suggested that it be considered in a plea bargain.

In re Roy C. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 912 Error to permit prosecution to amend the petition after the close of its case-in-chief to charge a lesser offense not necessarily included in the offense charged in the petition. Due process violated by permitting prosecutor to add PC § 245(a) charge after minor moved to dismiss PC §§ 211/242 at WIC § 701.1 motion. Situation placed minor in Hobson’s choice of presenting no defense and then appealing, giving up speedy trial rights to prepare further, or going ahead with inadequate notice. Decision to go ahead did not constitute waiver of issue.

In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475 Held proper for juvenile court to amend petition to conform to proof as to factual allegations (here identity of victim) where minor did not object or argue that he was prejudiced. Minor was on notice as to charges and allegations against which he had to defend.

In re David S. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 156 Use allegation may not be used to create a PC § 245(a) lesser in a petition alleging PC § 187 and PC 664/§187, but not alleging assault. Relies on People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, to the same effect, disapproving “bolstering” lessers by use of enhancements.

In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437 Absent “consent,” juvenile court may not sustain petition for offense which was not necessarily included within alleged offense. (Here reversal after PC § 242 was sustained on PC § 245 petition.) Adopts People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364 approach to juvenile proceedings, and rejects the argument that WIC § 678 (applying CCP § 469 et seq. to juvenile proceedings) requires the minor to show he was “misled to his prejudice” by the amendment.

In re Edward G. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4d 962 Assault with a firearm (Pen. Code § 245(a)(2)) is a necessarily-included offense of discharging a firearm from a vehicle at a person outside the vehicle (Pen. Code § 12034(c)). Penal Code § 654 precluded a finding the minor had committed both offenses.

In re Marcus T. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 468 Making a terrorist threat is not a necessarily included offense of threatening a public officer because making a terrorist threat can be committed without threatening a public officer. However, as pled in the charging instrument, Penal Code § 71 (threatening a public officer) was a lesser and necessarily included offense of Penal Code § 422 under the accusatory pleading test. The petition could not be sustained on both counts.

In re Jose H. (2000) 77 Cal.App. 4th 1090 Jose H. hit another student in the face with a closed fist. The blow caused the victim serious injuries resulting in surgery. The People filed a juvenile petition alleging assault and battery pursuant to PC §§ 245(a) and 243(d), each with a great bodily injury enhancement. Judgment affirmed as to the enhancements because assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury was not a lesser included offense of battery with serious bodily injury.

In re Alberto S. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1459 Sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of rape because a specific intent offense cannot be a lesser of a general intent offense.

In re Christopher S. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 620 Minor alleged to have committed burglary may not be found “guilty” of uncharged offense of receiving stolen property, because receiving is not a lesser included offense within burglary.

In re Greg F. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 466 Minor may not be “convicted” of non-lesser included offense. Juvenile court in this case improperly sustained non-lesser included offense of PC § 485 (misappropriation of lost property) when petition alleged PC § 496 (receiving stolen property). Since counsel had argued that PC § 485 was not a lesser, his failure to object after the court’s ruling could not be deemed a “consent” or “waiver” of the issue.

Abdullah B. v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 838 Unlike adult procedure, juveniles may not seek pre-adjudication writ review of denial of motion to suppress. No denial of equal protection since juvenile appeals take precedence.

In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 Minor could seek review of commitment to CYA 90 day diagnostic by way of habeas corpus rather than appeal because the issue was one of unlawful restraint. Since the attack went to a jurisdictional issue, the failure to object below did not constitute a waiver.

Ricki J. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 783 A minor cannot file an appeal while participating in informal probation (Welf. & Inst. Code § 654).

In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718 During adjudication the minor made a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence at the close of the People’s case (WIC § 701.1). The motion was denied. The minor then testified as part of the defense and provided additional evidence that assisted the People’s case. The petition was sustained by the juvenile court. The appellate court reversed. The People's case was insufficient and the motion to dismiss should have been granted. The fact that the minor testified after the denial of the motion and his testimony supplied the deficiency in the prosecution’s case does not result in waiver. Counsel was also ineffective in failing to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss.

In re Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152 The court held that in situations not involving a specified disposition, a minor’s general waiver will not preclude attacks on subsequent errors that are unforeseen or unforeseeable at the time the waiver was made. Because the matter of disposition was left unresolved at the time the minor admitted the criminal allegations, the length of a CYA commitment was an issue that fell outside his contemplation and knowledge when the waiver was made.

In re Byron S. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 822 Parents have a separate right to appeal from § 602 proceedings where physical custody of the minor is removed. However, where it is the minor who will be aggrieved by an error which precludes a parent's full participation in a hearing, the minor may raise such issue on appeal. Here, the minor was permitted to raise on appeal the failure of the juvenile court to provide a deaf interpreter whom his father could understand.

In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952 Minor who admits allegations of a juvenile court petition need not secure certificate of probable cause to obtain appellate review.

Minor under 14 at time of offense is presumed incapable of committing criminal offense, unless clear proof he/she knew wrongfulness of the act. “Clear proof” equates with the clear and convincing standard of proof.

In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862 In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence such as the minor’s age, experience, and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense including its method of commission and concealment. The appellate court notes that James was 12 years and 10 months old at the time of the incident, he hid the phone under a bush immediately after he exited the vehicle, and told the deputy he did not want to lie anymore and that “he had done it.” The appellate court finds the effort to conceal the cell phone along with James’ comments to the deputy support the juvenile court’s finding that James understood the wrongfulness of entering the vehicle and taking the items.

In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289 Circumstantial evidence established that 11-year old did know wrongfulness of his behavior, which consisted of pinching the breasts of underage female minors. Minor, however, lacked requisite intent to prove a PC § 288(a).

In re Nirran W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1157 This decision allows a court to find Gladys R. satisfied if a minor admitted a prior petition that was similar but not identical to the present charge.

In re Harold M. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 380 Minor's understanding of wrongfulness can be distilled from his prior record in facts of the case.

In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229 The California Supreme Court holds that the standard of proof at a Gladys R. hearing is “clear proof,” which equates with the clear and convincing standard of proof, as opposed to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to elements of the offense, but not to the separate issue of capacity.

In re Crystal J. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 596. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the seven-year-old boy was incompetent to testify since there was evidence that he did not understand his duty to testify truthfully. The test is not whether the witness is testifying truthfully, but whether the witness has the capacity to understand his duty to testify truthfully. undefined notes undefined

WIC § 676 Admission of public and persons having interest in case; exceptions; confidentiality of name; disclosure of court documents.

Rule 1410 5.530 Access to juvenile court hearings.

KGTV v. Superior Court (Niki M.) (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1673 The Court of Appeal held that a juvenile court judge could not admit members of the press into a juvenile detention hearing and then forbid them from disseminating information, legally obtained in the hearing, regarding the identity and likeness of a youthful murder suspect.

San Bernardino County Dept. of Public Social Services v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 188 In the context of dependency proceedings, a newspaper requested access to juvenile court files and records relating to multiple minors. The juvenile court denied access to the written records, but permitted the newspaper to attend court proceedings, on the condition that it refrain from publishing the names and/or likeness of any juvenile, and from interviewing any juvenile unless in the presence of his attorney. The court issued an order directing the juvenile court to vacate its order granting the press conditional access to the proceedings in issue. The court held that the conditions restricting what the newspaper could and could not publish were invalid. The appellate court reasoned that if the press lawfully obtains information, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a juvenile court from placing restrictions on the press' ability to then publish that information. This case provides a basis from which to argue for denying the media access to juvenile court proceedings and/or records, since once a juvenile court approves such access, the juvenile court lacks power to protect the confidentiality of information obtained therefrom.

Brian W. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 618 On a finding of direct and legitimate interest, the court has the discretion to allow the press to attend juvenile hearings provided that they agree to keep minor's identity secret. (Note that this case has been undercut by WIC § 676.) See also WIC § 676(d) which permits public access to certain juvenile court records.

WIC § 204 Permits information to be released to juvenile court participants.

WIC § 204.5 Permits disclosure of the name of a minor age 14 years or older declared a ward for an offense listed in PC § 667.5 or § 1192.7(c).

WIC § 602.5 Requires the court to report the criminal history of each minor adjudged a ward for a felony offense to the State Department of Justice.

WIC § 676 Juvenile proceedings concerning petitions alleging a violation of an offense listed in WIC § 707(b) shall be open to the public; exceptions; list of § 707(b) proceedings to be posted.

WIC § 827 This section governs juvenile case file inspection; confidentiality; release; and destruction.

WIC §§ 827.2 - 830.1 Mandatory and permissive dissemination of juvenile offender information.

Rule 1423 5.552 Confidentiality of juvenile records; access.

In re Gina S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1074 Access to juvenile records is governed by Welfare and Institutions Code § 827. Section 827, subdivision (a), lists categories of people who have the right to “inspect” juvenile records without court order, including the prosecutor, minor, parents, and attorneys for the parties. This appellate court held that the right to inspect does not include the automatic right to copy documents in the file.

*Legislative Note: WIC § 827(a)(5) now provides the right to copies of the juvenile records.

In re Anthony H. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 495 California Rules of Court, rule 1423, sets forth the procedures for obtaining confidential juvenile records under Welfare and Institutions Code § 827. Rule 1423(b) provides in part that “Authorization for any person to inspect, obtain, or copy juvenile court records must be ordered by the juvenile court presiding judge or a judicial officer designated by the juvenile court presiding judge.” The Court of Appeal held that the designated judicial officer must be a judicial officer of the juvenile court.

In re Anthony H. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 495 California Rules of Court, rule 1423, sets forth the procedures for obtaining confidential juvenile records under Welfare and Institutions Code § 827. Rule 1423(b) provides in part that “Authorization for any person to inspect, obtain, or copy juvenile court records must be ordered by the juvenile court presiding judge or a judicial officer designated by the juvenile court presiding judge.” The Court of Appeal held that the designated judicial officer must be a judicial officer of the juvenile court.

People v. Superior Court of Tulare County (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 488 A grand jury has no self-executing right to inspect juvenile records and must petition the juvenile court as any “other person” under section 827(a)(1)(M). California Rules of Court, rule 1423(c), in part, requires that the petitioner describe in detail the reasons the records are being sought and their relevancy to the proceeding or purpose for which petitioner wishes to inspect or obtain the records. Here, the petitioner made no showing under the provisions of rule 1423, subdivision (c) or otherwise, to warrant the release of any of the desired records or information.

In re R. G. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1408 Appellant (father) was a schoolteacher. Juvenile court found that he had sexually abused his two daughters. The school district which employed father petitioned the juvenile court pursuant to WIC 827. The court finds that the confidentiality laws regarding the disclosure of juvenile court records are meant to protect the child’s privacy and not to protect adults from the consequences of their acts. The minor did not object to the release of the records to the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing.

Cimarusti v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 799 Petitioners (Youth Authority personnel) sought CYA juvenile records on some CYA wards in an administrative employment termination hearing pursuant to Gov. Code § 19574.1. The court upheld the denial of disclosure because the requested records were juvenile records and could only be disclosed by the juvenile court pursuant to § 827. The petitioners failed to comply with § 827 procedures.

In re Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 220 The appellate court held that an order granting a petition under WIC § 827 is appealable as a final judgement in a special proceeding (such as child abuse and neglect cases), even though a final decision as to which portions of the records could be released had not been reached. The court rejects argument that the legislature intended absolute confidentiality for juvenile court records. The Court of Appeals also held that the juvenile court needs to engage in a balancing test between the best interest of the minor versus the need for discovery in determining what, if anything, may be disclosed.

In re Tiffany G. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 443 The mother and stepfather disseminated confidential juvenile documents. The juvenile court entered a non-dissemination order. The mother argued the non dissemination order was improper because she was the mother as expressed in § 827. The court upheld the non-dissemination order based on the children’s right to privacy. Although mother had the right to access under § 827, she was not authorized to disseminate the information about the children.

San Bernardino County Dept. of Public Social Services v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 188 A newspaper requested access to juvenile court files and records relating to multiple minors. The juvenile court denied access to the written records, but permitted the newspaper to attend court proceedings, on the condition that it refrain from publishing the names and/or likeness of any juvenile, and from interviewing any juvenile unless in the presence of his attorney. The court issued an order directing the juvenile court to vacate its order granting the press conditional access to the proceedings in issue. The court held that the conditions restricting what the newspaper could and could not publish were invalid. The appellate court reasoned that if the press lawfully obtains information, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a juvenile court from placing restrictions on the press’ ability to then publish that information. This case provides a basis from which to argue for denying the media access to juvenile court proceedings and/or records, since once a juvenile court approves such access, the juvenile court lacks power to protect the confidentiality of information obtained therefrom.

Parmett v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1261 Juvenile records may not be unsealed even if a victim sues a minor or his parents. The laws of confidentiality pursuant to WIC § 781 applies to civil proceedings.

People v. Boyette (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1527 In a prosecution for burglary, the trial court committed reversible error failing to examine in camera the psychiatric and medical records of a minor witness to determine to what extent they are privileged and whether defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial might overcome any privilege applicable to a particular record.

Lorenza P. v. Superior Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 607 Holds that a criminal defendant who is the parent of a juvenile may inspect the minor’s juvenile court files without petitioning to the juvenile court. If the requesting party is not the minor or parent of the minor or the parent's attorney, the juvenile records must be reviewed in camera after a petition to the juvenile court has been filed.

WIC § 213 Confers contempt powers on juvenile courts.

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 1218, et. seq. Sets forth rules, proof requirements and penalties available in civil contempt proceedings.

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 1218, et. seq. Sets forth rules, proof requirements and penalties available in civil contempt proceedings.

In re Francisco S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 946 Francisco had admitted violating H & S § 11357(e) and was placed on probation. Francisco contended the trial court erred in imposing punishment for contempt that exceeds the maximum punishment that could be imposed for the offense for which he was on probation. Where a WIC § 602 ward could not be confined at all because his offense permitted no confinement, the court held the legislature's absolute prohibition against confining a delinquent ward for a longer time than permitted for an adult prohibited imposing confinement for contempt based on violations of probationary conditions.

In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283 The Supreme Court has decided that WIC § 601 wards can be incarcerated under certain circumstances by use of the court's contempt power.

In re Ricardo A. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1190 The juvenile court found the minor was in criminal contempt of court, in violation of PC § 166(4), because he violated the terms and conditions of his probation by possessing a knife and gang paraphernalia. The appellate court holds that a separate criminal contempt charge under PC § 166(4) is inappropriate for violations of probation conditions that are merely status offenses, and not separate crimes. The appellate court further holds that WIC § 213 is the legislative embodiment of the juvenile court's inherent contempt powers, and that the penalties for contempt of juvenile court are defined in CCP § 1218, et. seq.

In re Ronald S. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 866 PC § 166.4 (contempt) cannot be used to detain § 601’s.

In re Mary D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 34 PC § 166.4 (contempt) cannot be used to confine § 602's who run away.

WIC §§ 637 - 638; Rule 1476 5.762 Detention rehearings

WIC § 657; Rule 1485 5.774 Time for jurisdiction hearing (detained w/in 15 court days otherwise 30 calendar days).

WIC § 682; Rule 1486 5.776 (a) To continue any hearing regardless of the custody status of the minor, a case may be continued beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required with written notice (filed and served 2 court days before the hearing) establishing good cause for the continuance. (b) A continuance shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary. Neither stipulation of the parties nor convenience is in itself good cause. The facts which establish good cause for the continuance shall be entered into the minutes. (c) Written notice and motion for continuance may be excused with good cause. (e) A hearing continued pursuant to § 682 shall commence on the date to which it was continued or within 7 days thereafter if good cause exists and the moving party will be prepared to proceed at that time.

WIC § 700 The court shall continue the hearing for not to exceed seven days to make an appointment of counsel, or to enable counsel to acquaint himself or herself with the case.

In re Eric (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 624 It is a violation of the minor’s due process rights and rights to a fair hearing to deny a request for a continuation in order to secure a parent's presence at the hearing. It is clear that the attorney must make the proper showing that the minor’s defense is dependent on the presence of the parent. In this case, counsel argued that the psychological effect upon the minor of the mother's absence was so great as to render a proper defense impossible.

In re Edwayne V. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 171 Request by co-minor’s counsel for a continuance of a jurisdictional hearing is not good cause for a continuance of the minor’s adjudication. Relying on the adult rule which states that a defendant cannot waive the rights of a co-defendant to have a criminal proceeding commence within the period of time specified by statute, the court found no basis for a different rule for juveniles. The remedy is dismissal of the petition upon the expiration of the 15 day period after detention unless the minor is released from custody or unless the adjudication is continued pursuant to (former) Rules of Court 1352(a) and (e). Also remember that if the minor is released, the petition may be reset for hearing, but only within the time limits prescribed for nondetained minors. He may not be redetained on the new petition.

In re Lawanda L. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 423 Court may exercise its discretion to permit prosecution continuance to procure rebuttal witnesses. Even if rebuttal testimony surprises the defense, the remedy is a defense continuance to meet the new evidence, and not a dismissal.

Raul P. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 294 Minor cannot be “forced” to ask for a continuance for preparation of fitness report.

In re Cassandra R. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 670 Reversible error to deny continuance and force public defender to trial where he was unprepared to try the case, the case had been reassigned to a new public defender who was engaged elsewhere, and the “old” attorney no longer even possessed the case file.

In re Chuong D. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1303 The prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the jurisdictional hearing, and informed the court only after the adjudication was underway that his key witness was unavailable to testify for at least another week. The juvenile court granted the prosecutor’s request for an eight-day recess. Chuong appealed the order sustaining the petition contending this conduct effectively denied him his right to a speedy trial and that the court abused its discretion when it granted the request for an eight-day recess. The Court of Appeal agrees that the minor’s speedy trial right was violated and the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting a mid-trial recess but upheld the sustained petition. In essence, the adjudication did not commence within the statutory deadlines because the prosecutor was unprepared to try the matter to conclusion. However, because Chuong waited until after the petition was sustained before bringing his speedy trial claim to the appellate court, he must establish that the error amounted to a miscarriage of justice to reverse the jurisdictional order. The “prejudice” claimed, that evidence linking him to the crime was introduced after the midtrial recess, does not constitute a miscarriage of justice. Likewise, the juvenile court erred in granting the request for a continuance but because the minor waited until after the court issued its jurisdictional order, the minor must show legal prejudice.

In re Kerry K. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1 Kerry was detained and his jurisdiction hearing was continued at his request to October 5, 2005. Counsel for a co-minor made a motion to continue the jurisdiction hearing, Kerry objected to the continuance and stated that, if the court continued the hearing, he was entitled to release. The court found good cause, granted the co-minor’s motion to continue to October 25, 2005, and denied Kerry’s request to be released. The appellate court ruled the juvenile court erred when it refused to release Kerry. When a minor consents to a jurisdictional hearing beyond the 15-day statutory limit, “the hearing shall commence on the date to which it was continued or within seven days thereafter whenever the court is satisfied that good cause exists . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 682, subd. (e).) Consequently, the statutory time limit is seven days after the date to which the hearing was continued. Kerry could not be detained beyond this time limit, even if the jurisdiction hearing was continued for good cause.

A.A. v. Superior Court (2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 1 A.A. was detained on a petition alleging that he committed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. A.A. along with co-minors who were alleged to have participated in the same offenses had their adjudication set for November 3, 2003. On November 3, A’s counsel and the People were ready to proceed. However, counsel for two of the co-minors failed to appear and the attorneys specially appearing for them requested a continuance. The People asked the court to continue the matter pursuant to Penal Code § 1050.1 (adult co-defendant continuances) in lieu of severing the co-minors’ cases. Over A.’s objection he remained detained and the adjudication hearing was continued to November 17. When the parties appeared for a settlement conference on November 13, the court allowed one of the co-minors to substitute retained counsel for his appointed attorney. Retained counsel asked the court to continue the adjudication until December so he could prepare. Over A.’s objection, the court found good cause to continue the matter to December 9, 2003, and A. remained detained. The Court of Appeal directed the juvenile court to release A.A. from detention. Penal Code § 1050.1, a continuance statute, does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Continuances in juvenile proceedings are controlled by WIC §§ 682 and 700, and rules 1485 and 1486. The court shall continue the hearing for no longer than seven days to make an appointment of counsel or to enable counsel to acquaint himself with the case. (§ 682, subd.(b); rule 1486(a).) Here, the juvenile court continued the matter for 22 days. In the case of a detained minor, absent proper grounds for a continuance, the court is required either to release the minor and reset the jurisdiction hearing or proceed with the jurisdiction hearing within the statutory 15-day period.

In re Albert M. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 353 The trial court dismissed a petition under WIC § 782 (dismissal in the interests of justice) after a proceeding was continued 12 times in a 10 month period without objection. The Court of Appeal ruled that a petition could not be dismissed under WIC § 782 unless a court makes findings either that the interests of justice require dismissal or that the minor is not in need of treatment. Too many continuances alone do not justify dismissal under WIC § 782.

PC § 1240.1 Counsel’s mandatory duties regarding advising and filing an appeal.

WIC § 634 Minor's right to counsel in WIC § 601 and § 602 proceedings.

Rule 1412(h) 5.534 Rule correlating to WIC § 634, establishing minor's right to counsel.

Rule 1479 5.663 (a) [Purpose] This rule is designed to ensure public safety and the protection of the child’s best interest at every stage of the delinquency proceedings by clarifying the role of the child’s counsel in delinquency proceedings. This rule is not intended to affect any substantive duty imposed upon counsel by existing civil standards or professional discipline standards. (b) [Responsibilities of counsel] A child’s counsel is charged in general with defending the child against the allegations in all petitions filed in delinquency proceedings and with advocating, within the framework of the delinquency proceedings, that the child receive care, treatment, and guidance consistent with his or her best interest. (c) [Right to representation] A child is entitled to have the child’s interests represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, including postdispositional hearings. Counsel must continue to represent the child unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause. (d) [Limits to responsibilities] A child’s counsel is not required: (1) To assume the responsibilities of a probation officer, social worker, parent or guardian: (2) To provide nonlegal services to the child: or (3) To represent the child in any proceedings outside of the delinquency proceedings.

In re Robert E. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 557 The juvenile court found that a minor committed perjury when he testified in his own defense in a previous trial. While at juvenile detention camp following a hearing in the earlier matter, the minor was visited by police officers, who interviewed him concerning his testimony. The minor admitted testifying falsely. The minor moved to exclude the confession in this case on the ground that his right to counsel, pursuant to U.S. Const., 6th Amend., was denied. The juvenile court admitted the minor's confession into evidence. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the juvenile court properly admitted the minor’s confession, since the confession was not obtained by police officers in violation of the minor’s U.S. Const., 6th Amend., right to counsel. The perjury occurred after the minor was accused of other charges and was not part of the same conduct underlying those charges. The right to counsel did not attach to the charge of perjury. Although the subject of the perjured testimony was also the subject of the underlying charges, the perjury itself involved an entirely different time, place, and activity.

In re Michael L. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 462 The appellate court found that because CYA repeatedly frustrated the attorney’s reasonable attempts to review the file and assist the child at a review hearing. The child was entitled to promptly receive a new review hearing with adequate notice to the attorney and opportunity to review the file. But the court found that the evidence contained in the record of the parole board hearing was sufficient to support the parole board’s decision not to grant release; so the court denied the child’s request for immediate release from CYA.

In re Shawnn F. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 184 Under the Sixth Amendment, a minor has the right to be represented by counsel, as well as the right to represent himself, with the caveat that the individual representing himself must understand the charges against him, as well as the consequences of waiving his right to counsel. (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365.) The court found that the minor was unable to properly realize the consequences of either his actions which brought about the charges against him, or the charges themselves. Additionally, the court found that the minor was under the control of an adult, his father, not an attorney, who exerted pressure upon the minor to choose self-representation over being represented by the Public Defender.

In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718 Counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss.

WIC § 207.1 Minors may not be detained in adult jails or lockups, except that: (1) unfit minors may be housed separately in adult facilities upon a finding that their detention in juvenile hall would endanger the public or minors at the hall, or (2) minors 14 years or older may be held separately in adult jail facilities for up to six hours if they are a serious security risk to themselves or others.

WIC § 207.6 A minor may be detained in a jail or other secure facility for the confinement of adults pursuant to § 207.1 or § 707.1 only if the court makes its findings on the record and, in addition, finds that the minor poses a danger to the staff, other minors in the juvenile facility, or to the public because of the minor’s failure to respond to the disciplinary control of the juvenile facility, or because the nature of the danger posed by the minor cannot safely be managed by the disciplinary procedures of the juvenile facility.

WIC § 208.5 Minors who turn 18 while in juvenile institution may be allowed to come into contact with juveniles until age 19, at which time the probation officer may recommend transfer to adult facilities. The minor has a right to be advised of such intent and the juvenile court may order continued detention in juvenile hall.

WIC § 707.1 (Amended - If continued detention is ordered for a ward 19-21 years old, he or she may be housed with detained minors.) Unfit minors stay in juvenile hall unless the court makes a finding of danger to public or other inmates; but upon reaching 18, unfit minors shall be delivered to sheriff unless juvenile court makes a finding he should remain in juvenile hall. Minors sent to adult facilities must be segregated from adult prisoners. Unfit minors are entitled to have bail set at the conclusion ofthe fitness proceedings.

PC § 290(d) List of sex crimes for which juvenile offenders committed to the CYA must register.

WIC § 727.2 Provides that any minor adjudged a ward of the court for the commission of a sexually violent offense as defined in WIC § 6600, and committed to the Youth Authority shall be given sexual offender treatment.

WIC §§ 6600-6600.1(g) A juvenile adjudication is a Sexually Violent Predator prior (“SVP Prior”) if the following conditions are met: (1) the minor was 16 years of age or older at the time of the prior offense; (2) the prior offense is enumerated as a sexually violent offense per WIC § 6600(b); the minor was declared a 602 ward for commission of a sexually violent offense defined in WIC § 6600(b); and (4) the minor was committed to CYA. A minor committed to CYA on a sexually violent offense per WIC § 6600(b) must be provided sexual offender specific treatment at CYA. Note: Only one juvenile adjudication, which must meet all of the SVP prior criteria, can be utilized as an SVP prior. Also, the provisions of WIC § 6600.1 do not apply to juvenile SVP priors.

In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535 Derrick admitted committing sexual battery (Pen. Code § 243.4(a)). He failed on probation and was sent to the Youth Authority. He was ordered to register as a sexual offender upon his release from the Youth Authority. Derrick appealed asserting that the juvenile court had no statutory authority to require him to register because sexual battery is not included in the Penal Code § 290(d) list of crimes that require juvenile registration upon release from the youth authority. The California Supreme Court reversed. A juvenile offender may not be ordered to register as a sex offender under Penal Code § 290 if his offenses are not among those listed in subdivision (d)(3).

In re Alex N. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 18 The Penal Code § 290(d)(1) registration requirement only applies to persons committed to CYA because of a sex offense. If a minor is committed to CYA for non-sex offenses, § 290(d)(1) does not apply and registration is not required. Although the juvenile court expressly declined to dismiss the prior sex offenses, the court could have also avoided the registration requirement by not aggregating the sustained sex counts. (Welf & Inst. Code § 726(c).) The juvenile court also failed to determine the maximum period of confinement based on the facts and circumstances of those offenses upon which it chooses to impose a CYA commitment. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 731.)

In re G.C. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 405 At the disposition hearing the court refused the minor’s request that he only be committed to DJJ on the non-sex related counts to avoid the sex offender registration requirement. The minor was committed to DJJ for nine years based on the current § 288(a) and other previous petitions and offenses. The minor appealed contending an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. This court concludes that WIC §§ 725.5 and 731(c) don’t allow the court to disregard a minor’s current sustained petition. This court distinguishes In re Alex N., (above), by noting the sex count was contained within a prior petition and that court had the discretion to not aggregate the prior petition with the current petition when committing the minor to DJJ.

In re Bernadino S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613 A minor may not be required to register as a sex offender unless the minor has been discharged or paroled from CYA after having committed one of the offenses listed in that section.

In re Prentiss C. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1484 On appeal, the minor raised one issue: whether or not the court erred in setting the maximum period of confinement by giving the minor full consecutive terms for the sex offenses pursuant to PC § 667.5 instead of imposing one-third the base term under PC § 1170.1, subdivision (a). The Court of Appeal affirmed the full consecutive terms. The Court of Appeal held that if the legislature had wanted to limit PC § 1170.1 in the way the minor suggested, they could have done so. In the absence of any express limitation however, the minor’s construction of the statute was not reasonable, and the trial court’s calculation of aggregate custody was undertaken correctly.

In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058 The juvenile court is entitled to look beyond the pleadings and consider the circumstances of the minor’s offense in determining whether the offense falls within Welfare and Institutions Code § 707, subdivision (b), for purposes of determining whether the maximum CYA jurisdiction is to age 25; otherwise the maximum jurisdiction is age 21 (Welf. & Inst. Code § 1769(b)). Although the minor was charged with a violation of Penal Code § 288.5 (continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14, an offense not explicitly listed in § 707(b)), the evidence presented during the adjudication established that the minor’s acts constituted “rape with force or violence or threat of great bodily harm,” an act that qualifies under § 707(b)(4). This appellate court further finds that any violation of Penal Code section 288.5 also qualifies as a § 707(b) offense under § 707(b)(6).

In re Daniel W. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 159 The court allows hearsay to establish the identity of the offender under section 1253 when the sexual offender is a member of the victim's family or household. The court finds that in a “family situation,” the identity of the abuser is reasonably pertinent to the victim's proper treatment because all victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of the abuser. The court reasons that a physician generally must know who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the physician's treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim's family and household.

WIC § 602.3 Requires the juvenile court to commit any minor adjudicated to be a ward of the court for the personal use of a firearm in the commission of a violent felony, as defined in Penal Code § 667.5, subd. (c), to placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, or with the Youth Authority. The court may impose a treatment-based alternative placement if the minor has a mental disorder that requires intensive treatment. (See similar provision in § 707(d)(5).)

WIC § 625.3 Adds possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony to those crimes (personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony) for which a minor age 14 or older cannot be released until he or she is brought before a judicial officer.

In re Jose A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 697 A minor who used a pellet gun threateningly was charged with assault with a firearm (PC § 245(a)(2)) and exhibiting a firearm in an angry manner (PC § 417(a)(2)). Ruling that a pellet gun is not a firearm within the meaning of PC §§ 245(a)(2) and 417(a)(2), the Court of Appeal stated that the main difference between a pellet gun and a firearm is that a “pellet gun” uses compressed air while a “firearm” expels a projectile by combustion.

In re Edward G. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 962 Assault with a firearm (Pen. Code § 245(a)(2)) is a necessarily-included offense of discharging a firearm from a vehicle at a person outside the vehicle (Pen. Code § 12034(c)). Penal Code section 654 precluded a finding the minor had committed both offenses.

In re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190 This minor fired one shot at three police officers. The Supremes uphold three firearm use enhancements under PC § 245(d)(1). The reasoning of the court borders on unintelligible, but they say that if a defendant robs seven people in a store with a single display of a firearm, that’s seven robberies and seven use-of-a-gun enhancements.

In re Michael R. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1203 A box cutter does not constitute a “razor with an unguarded blade” and therefore does not qualify as a weapon under Penal Code § 626.10, subdivision (a).

In re Do Kyung K. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 583 A plain, single-sided razor blade is not a “razor with an unguarded blade” prohibited by Penal Code § 626.10, subd. (a).

In re Arturo H. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1694 A person violates PC § 626.10 by bringing an inoperable pellet gun onto a school campus. The appellate court reasoned that numerous cases have interpreted the laws prohibiting possession and use of firearms to apply even if the gun in question is inoperable. The court noted that the common thread underlying these cases is that “[d]anger radiates not only from the weapon, but from the defensive reaction of others.” Moreover, pellet guns are reasonably perceived as dangerous weapons, capable of inflicting serious injury.

In re Martin Alonzo L. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 93 Penal Code § 12020(a)(1) and (c)(7) prohibits the possession of metal knuckles. Section 12020 requires that the person knew the object that could be used as a weapon. The minor possessed a wallet fitted with metal spikes positioned to protrude between the fingers if the wallet was held in a closed fist. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the finding the minor knew he was carrying an object that could be used as a weapon because he had the object, knew it was fitted with spikes, and the wallet contained no money, cards, or photographs.

In re Luke W. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 650 The juvenile court found true an allegation that the minor had been in possession of a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code § 12020, subd. (a). The object seized resembled an audiocassette tape, and contained a compass, magnifying glass, tweezers, a toothpick, can opener, screwdriver, and a knife. In function, though not appearance, a quasi- Swiss Army pocketknife. Section 12020 has an exception for pocketknives so this pocketknife like contraption doesn’t qualify as a dirk or dagger. In addition, because the blade can’t be extracted without the use of both hands, it does not fit the definition of a switchblade.

In re Ricardo A. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1265 The appellate court upholds a finding of a violation of PC § 12020(a), concealed dirk or dagger, for this dirk in plain view behind this kid’s ear. It says this is concealment because from the front it looked like a pen.

In re Victor B. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 521 After a good review of cases involving unusual metal objects in light of § 12020, the court concludes that based on the nature of the object (two three and one half inch pieces with one piece fitting inside the other which when assembled has finger grips and a metal point), its alteration from its original use and the minor's statement, the trier of fact could find that it was a dirk or dagger under PC § 12020(a).

In re Conrad V. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 775 A knife-like instrument with a one-and-a-half inch blade sharpened on one side, but with no handle, is not a “dirk or dagger” for purposes of PC § 12020(a).

In re David S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1160 Penal Code § 12021, subdivisions (c)(1) and (e), prohibits a juvenile who has committed any of the offenses enumerated in the statute [including Penal Code §§ 148, 171, 186.28, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244.5, 245, 245.5, 246.3, 247, 273.5, 273.6, 417, 417.6, 422, 626.9, 646.9, and 12023 among others] from possessing a firearm until age 30. Although Penal Code § 243.6 (battery on a school employee) is not among the enumerated offenses, it qualifies for the prohibition because simple battery (§ 242), a necessarily included offense, is listed in the section.

In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336 Prosecutor need not prove lack of written consent and need not question both parents as to lack of consent in PC § 12021.5 case (minor's possession of concealable firearm without parental consent). Existence of written permission must be raised by the minor.

In re Bartholomew D. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 317 The minor used a BB gun to rob the pizza delivery man. The court sustained the charge of robbery and an enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon under Penal Code § 12022(b). The appellate court holds that a BB gun is a dangerous weapon because it is dangerous to others in the ordinary use for which it was designed, which is to expel a metal projectile at a target.

In re Christopher K. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 853 Penal Code § 12091 creates a presumption that the possessor of a weapon with an obliterated serial number did the obliteration. The appellate court finds this is an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.

In re Arcenio V. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 613 Penal Code § 12101(b)(1) prohibits the possession of live ammunition by a minor not engaged in a specified activity. At adjudication the officer testified he removed ammunition from a handgun the minor possessed. The appellate court held the above testimony was insufficient to establish the rounds were “live” within the meaning of § 12101(b)(1).

In re Carleisha P. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 912 The term “ammunition” prohibits the possession of any quantity of live ammunition, whether of the same or different types. Simultaneous possession of three different types of ammunition constitutes a single offense.

In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130 A petition alleging a minor to be in possession of “live” ammunition can be sustained by circumstantial evidence. No testing of ammunition is necessary.

Availability - A M cannot be placed on 654.2 probation after adjudication or after an admission to thte charge.

PC § 186.22(d) Misdemeanors committed for the benefit of a street gang are wobblers.

WIC § 702 Findings in support of wardship declaration

WIC § 702 Findings in support of wardship declaration

In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199 WIC § 702 requires when a minor has committed an offense punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor in the case of an adult, the juvenile court must declare the offense classification.

In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814 WIC § 702 requirement that offense be declared a misdemeanor or felony was sufficiently complied with by court’s entry in minutes of order detailing stipulation by counsel that the offense, declared to be a felony, would be reduced to a misdemeanor upon minor's satisfactory completion of one year on probation. Such an agreement is valid.

In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 Court must make a finding under WIC § 702 as to whether offense is felony or misdemeanor even though the pleadings described it as a felony. Case remanded for a determination of character of offense.

In re Curt W. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 169 Court can defer declaration as to whether offense is felony or misdemeanor until dispositional hearing. (See Rules 1487 and 1488.)

Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894 The California Supreme Court finds that section 186.22, subdivision (d), is a penalty provision that applies to all misdemeanors and felonies. In short, whenever it is plead and proven that a misdemeanor was committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang, the offense becomes a “wobbler” (misdemeanor/felony) and the offender can be confined for up to three years.

In re Raymond M. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1508 The juvenile court found the minor guilty of burglary of the residence, residential burglary, and receiving stolen property. The Court of Appeal held that the failure of the juvenile court to expressly find burglary in the first degree did not require that the findings be reduced to the second degree pursuant to PC §§ 1157 and 1192. However, the court held that juvenile courts have discretion to grant leniency by reducing the degree of a crime even if the facts support a first degree finding.

In re Jesse P. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1177 The adult court rule permitting allegations of murder to be pled without specifying the degree applies to juvenile court law. The court reasoned that even though juveniles do not have the benefit of preliminary hearings and grand jury indictments, due process is satisfied since juveniles can file a demurrer, request discovery or request a prima facie detention hearing to learn more about the charge.

In re Andrew I. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 572 The trial court found the minor committed a residential burglary. The minor argued that because the court failed to designate the degree of the offense, the crime is deemed a second degree burglary. The court ruled that the characterization of the offense was sufficiently descriptive to support a first degree burglary finding.

In re Dorothy B. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 509 Juvenile court may fix the degree of the offense at the time of disposition even though this would not be permissible in adult court. Former Rule 1355(f)(5), permits a determination of degree at the time of disposition and the rule does not conflict with WIC § 702 requiring “findings” to be made prior to disposition. (Now Rule 5.780(e).)

WIC § 656 Sets forth requirements of petition. (See also PC §§ 952, 954, and 1004 on demurrers generally.)

WIC § 241.1 Establishes a procedure for a pre-adjudicatory social study to be completed in all cases in which a dependent minor is charged in a delinquency petition brought pursuant to WIC §§ 601 or 602. The social study is to be a joint one, authored by both the probation officer assigned to the minor’s WIC § 600 matter, and the social worker assigned to the minor’s dependency matter. The report should render a consensus recommendation by the two departments as to whether the minor and the needs of public safety are better addressed through the delinquency court system or the dependency court system. Subdivision (c) prohibits joint, simultaneous delinquency wardship and dependency jurisdiction. Requires notice to any other juvenile court having jurisdiction over a minor, of the presentation of the recommendations of a county probation department and a county welfare department about what status will serve the best interest of the minor, where the minor appears to come within the description of both WIC § 300 and WIC § 601 or WIC § 602. The notice must include the name of the judge to whom, or the courtroom to which, the recommendations were presented. When one county already has jurisdiction over a minor as a ward of the court or as a dependent child, and then another county asserts jurisdiction, both counties must determine which status will best serve the interests of the minor and the protection of society, and present their recommendations to the juvenile court. The juvenile court will decide which status is appropriate for the minor.

Effective 1-1-05; § 241.1 is amended to remove the prohibition against a juvenile court declaring a child to be simultaneously a dependent child of the court and a delinquent ward of the court. Subdivision (e) authorizes a probation department and the child welfare services department, in consultation with the presiding judge of a county’s juvenile court, to create a written protocol to permit the probation department and the child welfare services department to jointly assess and produce a recommendation that a child be designated as a dual status child, allowing the child to be simultaneously a dependent child and a ward of the court. Counties participating under this section must adopt either an “on-hold” system or a “lead court/lead agency” system. Simultaneous case management or services by both the county probation department and the child welfare services department is prohibited.

Rule 1403.5 5.512 Creates a procedure as mandated by section 241.1 by requiring a joint assessment by the child welfare and probation departments, requiring notice and copies of the report to be distributed to all the parties, lists the factors to be addressed within the report, sets the time limits for the hearing, and requires that all the parties have an opportunity to be heard at the hearing. (a). Requires the responsible child welfare and probation departments to complete the joint assessment as soon as possible after the child comes to the attention of either department and provides a mandatory time period in which the report must be submitted. Whenever possible the determination of status must be made before any petition is filed. At the latest, notice and copies of the assessment must be provided 5 calendar days prior to the hearing date. (b) and (c). Establish a joint procedure and recommendation whether the petition alleging jurisdiction is filed in the same county where the child is already a dependent or ward, or the situation where the petition is filed in a different county. (d). Requires the report to address a description of the nature of the referral; the age of the child, the history of any physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the child; the prior record of the child’s parents for abuse of this or any other child; the prior record of the child for out-of-control or delinquent behavior; the parent’s cooperation with the child’s school; the child’s functioning at school; the nature of the child’s home environment; the history of involvement of any agencies or professionals with the child and his or her family; any services or community agencies that are available to assist the child and his or her family. (e). Requires that the hearing occur no later than 15 court days after the order of detention and prior to the jurisdiction hearing. If the child is not detained, the hearing on the joint assessment must occur within 30 days of the date of the petition and prior to the jurisdictional hearing. The juvenile court must conduct the hearing and determine which type of jurisdiction over the child best meets the child’s unique circumstances. (f). Requires at least 5 calendar days before the hearing, notice and copies of the assessment must be provided to the child, the child’s parent or guardian, all attorneys of record, any Court Appointed Special Advocate, and any juvenile court having jurisdiction over the child. (g). Provides that all parties and their attorneys must have an opportunity to be heard at the hearing. The court must make its determination on the appropriate status for the child and either state its reasons on the record or in a written order.

WIC §§ 654/725(a) These sections establish, respectively, pre-adjudication juvenile diversion and a postadjudication, alternative disposition that does not involve formal declaration of wardship. Accordingly, dependent minors whose delinquency matters are handled through either of these sections may be able to retain their dependent status.

In re Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248 The appellate court affirms, concluding a minor does not have a due process right to a full evidentiary hearing on a § 241.1 determination. Section 241.1 does not require the juvenile court to conduct a hearing. It requires a joint assessment report and a court determination as to whether to treat a minor as a dependent child or a delinquent ward. Rule 1403.5 does not mandate a hearing, providing “the court may set a hearing for a determination.” Moreover, once a § 241.1 hearing is set, only the parties and their attorneys have an express right to be heard. (Rule 1403.5(g).) The due process clause requires that the determination be made in compliance with basic procedural protections afforded to similar judicial determinations. Neither the United States nor California Supreme Courts necessarily found that basic procedural protections of a juvenile court judicial determination regarding juvenile jurisdiction included a full evidentiary hearing. The appellate court notes that nothing precludes the juvenile court from exercising its discretion to grant a full hearing and permit additional evidence. A full hearing is unnecessary where the juvenile court has before it sufficient evidence in the § 241.1 assessment report to make an informed decision.

In re Marcus G. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008 Appellant minor, who had previously been declared a dependent of the juvenile court, was arrested for robbery. The juvenile court dismissed the dependency proceedings. The appellate court reversed. The record did not show that the procedures for handling cases with potential dual jurisdiction set forth in WIC § 241.1 were followed.

Rule 1485(d) 5.774 Prohibits detention where petitions are refiled after dismissal for failure to comply with time limits.

In re Tan T. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1398 The statutory language of WIC § 631 is clear and the legislative intent regarding the detention of juveniles is clear, a minor must be released from custody unless a petition is filed within 48 hours of arrest, excluding nonjudicial days. The court reasoned that WIC § 631 is clear in stating that the “minor shall be released within 48 hours after been taken into custody, excluding nonjudicial days,” unless a petition has been filed against the minor.

In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337 Where prosecution refiles case on minor already detained fifteen (15) judicial days, minor cannot be detained any longer. Violation of § 631 or §632 time limits require minor's release even if he qualifies for detention otherwise.

In re Angel M. (1997) 58 Cal.App. 4th 1498 The minor was detained upon arrest, and a delinquency petition filed within 48 hours of that arrest (excluding non-judicial days), per WIC § 631. However, probation failed to cause the minor to appear before the juvenile court by the end of the next judicial day, following the filing of the petition as required by WIC § 632. The minor demanded immediate release, which the juvenile court refused. The minor sought a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court holds that WIC § 632's time limits are to be strictly construed, and absent new facts justifying the minor's detention, the minor must be released. The fact that no parent or guardian is available to take custody of the minor does not justify detention.

Alfredo A. v. Superior Court (1994) 6 Cal.4th 1212 Due to the need for flexibility and informality in juvenile proceedings, a minor's constitutional right to a speedy probable cause determination is satisfied if a detention hearing or probable cause determination is conducted within 72 hours of the minor being taken into custody. This is in contrast to the requirement, set forth in Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 111 U.S. 1661, that an adult receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours.

In re Luis M. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1090 The minor does not have the right to confront and cross-examine the crime victims at a Dennis H. hearing. California Rules of Court, Rule 1323(c) provides, “In making the findings prerequisite to an order of detention at the detention hearing, the court may rely solely upon written police reports, probation reports or other documents.” Rule 1323(c) is an exception to the statutory right to confrontation (Welf. & Inst. Code § 630(b)).

In re Mary T. (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 38 The prosecutor must make a prima facie showing that the minor knew of the wrongfulness of his act (PC § 26; Gladys R.) in order to justify detention at a Dennis H. hearing.

In re Korry K. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 967 Minor entitled to produce evidence at the detention hearing that amounts to an affirmative defense (e.g., evidence of self-defense).

Edsel P. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 763 This case discusses Dennis H. and William M. at length in the context of requiring that a pre-fitness prima facie case be shown by the prosecution.

In re Dennis H. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 350 Minor has right to rehearing on detention at which time prima facie case with competent evidence must be shown for detention. Hearsay is okay, but there must be sufficient credible factual data to show prima facie case. Minor has right to confront and cross-examine declarant of documentary evidence. If those persons are not present at rehearing, court cannot rely on the written declarations.

David B. v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 623 Minor detained beyond the statutory time for fitness hearing (former Rule 1346(b)), was entitled to release even though part of the over-detention was due to his attorney's exercise of right to continuance to review fitness report.

In re Talbott (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1290 Minors are entitled to hearings on the issue of detention before a previously released minor can be separated from parental custody at disposition. Restating the rule in In re Macidon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 608, this court found that a minor who admitted at adjudication and was subsequently detained at disposition without any further evidence, was entitled to a hearing to contest the reasons for detention. A mere finding of jurisdiction is not enough to show new facts or evidence sufficient to justify a detention.

In re Kevin B. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 808 Minor on “released” petition can be detained after adjudication hearing. The finding that he is a person described as § 602 is sufficient since sustaining of petition shows he violated court order under WIC § 636.

In re Thomas F. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1249 The juvenile court has discretion to order reciprocal discovery consistent with Penal Code section 1054, et seq. in a delinquency case. In the absence of an express order for reciprocal discovery by the juvenile court, the provisions of Penal Code 1054 do not automatically apply to a delinquency proceeding. In this case, even though the parties may have been under the impression they were subject to reciprocal discovery obligations, the court made no discovery orders. The juvenile court’s sanction of excluding witnesses in the absence of an express order for reciprocal discovery deprived Thomas of his federal constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel.

Clinton K. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1244 Clinton was charged with murder, attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The people moved that he should not be treated under juvenile court law according to WIC § 707. Additionally, the people moved for discovery regarding the §707 hearing. Clinton challenged the motion, arguing that discovery is only possible in preparation for trial and only upon a showing of good cause. The trial court ordered Clinton to produce the names and addresses of witnesses to be called at the § 707 hearing, experts’ reports, physical and mental examinations, and real evidence to be used at the hearing. The court did not order Clinton to provide written and recorded statements of witnesses and allowed his attorney to excise sections of the experts' reports protected by privilege. The appellate court ruled that the juvenile court has the inherent power to order discovery prior to a § 707 hearing. The party seeking discovery carries the burden of showing that disclosure will not unduly delay or prolong the proceeding.

In re Robert S. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 18 The trial court granted the prosecution’s discovery motion ordering the defense to provide the names and addresses of witnesses, relevant written statements of those witnesses, and real evidence to be used at trial. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's order and held that although Proposition 115 does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, the juvenile court has inherent power to order discovery

In re Jesse P. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1177 The minor’s right to discovery in a juvenile matter is not discretionary with the court. A juvenile has the same discovery rights as adult defendants have. The prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose any evidence which is favorable to the minor including probation reports, relevant statements of witnesses and experts, and any other evidence to be offered at adjudication.

People v. Boyette (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1527 The trial court committed reversible error by failing to examine in camera the psychiatric and medical records of a minor witness to determine to what extent they are privileged and whether defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial might overcome any privilege applicable to a particular record.

In re Maria V. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1099 Termination of parental rights case discussing right to access to juvenile delinquency files. WIC § 827 permits inspection by court personnel, the probation officer writing the report, the minor, parents or guardian, and attorneys for the parties. Persons not specified in the statute are entitled to disclosure if, in the discretion of the court, disclosure is in the best interest of the minor.

People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924 Fact of pending juvenile case can be used for impeachment of witness. [Note that this is a cross examination case, but use it to support discovery of juvenile rap to use for impeachment.]

Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 Defendant has right to go into juvenile witnesses' background even though confidential, as part of right to fair trial.

Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797 Adult criminal discovery rules apply to juveniles.

In re Jesus J. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1057 A juvenile court judge was found to have improperly dismissed a petition, with prejudice, as a sanction for the People’s failure to provide timely discovery.

In re Jesse L. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 202 Delay in receiving discovery allows for a continuance.

Giovanni B. v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 312 Giovanni was charged with possession of a dirk or dagger. He filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery from the police department of complaints against the arresting officers relating to false statements in reports or other acts of dishonesty. Giovanni asserted that the information would be relevant to a motion to suppress, in which he would assert that the officers wrote false information in their police report to justify a detention and patdown. The juvenile court summarily denied the Pitchess motion. The Court of Appeal denied Giovanni’s petition for a writ of mandate, holding that the juvenile did not demonstrate good cause for an in camera review of the confidential records. Giovanni was detained and placed into temporary custody based in part on his appearing to be underage and on the streets after midnight. Giovanni’s suspected violation of the city’s curfew ordinance provided the officers with an objectively reasonable basis for a detention. Giovanni could not contest the validity of the stop and search by asserting that the officers’ other observations concerning suspected criminal activity were false and a subterfuge to support the stop. The materials sought by the Pitchess motion were irrelevant to the proposed defense because the officers had probable cause to detain and search the juvenile based on uncontested facts that were independent of the alleged falsehood

San Jose v. Superior Court (Michael B.) (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47 Minor filed a discovery motion pursuant to EC § 1045 (Pitchess). After an in camera review of the police department records, the court ordered the city to disclose eleven complaints against the officers, as well as the official results of investigation of those complaints (disciplinary records). The city sought a writ of mandate. The Supreme Court held that Pitchess discovery and Evidence Code § 1043, et. seq. apply to juvenile proceedings. Evidence Code § 1045(a) authorizes discovery of the discipline imposed upon a police officer by the employing agency.

Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120 Minor accused of selling marijuana is entitled to discover citizen complaints against arresting officers for racial prejudice, false arrest, illegal search and seizure, and other dishonesty or improper tactics, where defense alleges materiality to a defense of false arrest, and the officers’ “character, habits, customs and credibility” would be a material issue at the adjudication.

Dell M. v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 782 Pitchess discovery rules apply to juvenile cases.

WIC § 701, § 701.1 Provides for proof beyond a reasonable doubt or dismissal upon finding that minor does notcome within WIC § 602. .

WIC § 782 Court has power to dismiss petitions in interest of justice

People v. Superior Court (Jorge C.) (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1114 The juvenile court dismissed a petition with prejudice on the ground that the minor had been prejudiced by an adjudication delay. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating that the nature of the charges, the length of delay (three weeks) and the lack of prejudice balanced against dismissal.

In re Saul (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1061 Sustained petition for attempted murder did not bar prosecution for murder when victim died two years later. No double jeopardy violation since the facts supporting the second prosecution (death of the victim) had not occurred at the time of the first petition.

In re Nan P. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 751 The refiling of a misdemeanor petition is not a denial of equal protection because the purpose of juvenile law is still rehabilitation while the philosophy for adults is primarily punishment.

Alex T. v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 24 PC § 1387 bar against refiling of adult misdemeanor cases does not apply in juvenile court.

In re Henry C. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 646 No double jeopardy violation where court declared mistrial after stating that, because of preconceived notions as to credibility of witnesses, it could not be impartial. Court of Appeal said this was “legal necessity” requiring a mistrial.

In re Mitchell G. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 66 Double jeopardy bars the People from appealing the denial of a suppression (WIC § 700.1) motion when the suppression motion is heard concurrently with the adjudication hearing

In re Kenneth S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 54 Welfare and Institutions Code § 800(b)(4) authorizes an appeal from an order dismissing or terminating a juvenile action before a minor has been placed in jeopardy, or where the minor has waived jeopardy. Jeopardy attached when the first witness was sworn to testify regarding the offense in question. A “motion for a new trial” pursuant to the Penal Code is unauthorized in juvenile delinquency proceedings, but is tantamount to a motion under Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 775 or 778. By attacking the juvenile court findings, a minor implicitly agrees that he could be readjudicated if his challenge prevailed.

In re Stephen P. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 123 No double jeopardy violation for court to reopen case to correct clerical error minutes after the petition was sustained in order to change its finding from a non-lesser to the greater offense alleged. Allowed because there was no reopening of evidence or a second trial involved and only a short time period involved before discovery of “judicial mistake.”

Derek L. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 228 Court’s dismissal under Rule 1351(e), (renumbered as Rule 1486) does not bar refiling. No speedy trial violation here and prosecution’s bad faith conduct did not deny minor a fair trial.

Arlyn R. v. Superior Court (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 1025 Decision by police to release minor and “close” the case does not bar a later filing of petition arising out of the same incident.

In re Michael V. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 159 Previously suppressed evidence may be used against the minor at disposition hearings.

In re Anthony H. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1123 Prosecutor who agreed to have minor's motion to suppress confession heard in front of judge other than trial judge was bound by that agreement when minor won the motion. Though there was no right to have a separate judge hear the confession motion, the oral stipulation was binding.

In re Tracy L. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1454 A petition was sustained in juvenile court for forcible rape and the minor was committed to CYA. Subsequently, the adult court granted the minor transactional immunity to testify against his adult co-participants. The Court of Appeal rejected the minor's argument that the immunity in the adult trial mandated the dismissal of the juvenile court petition, reasoning that transactional immunity only guarantees immunity from future prosecution, not past convictions.

WIC § 17.1 Defines residence of minor as his place of abode, or the place of abode of the person legally entitled to custody; special rules for foundlings and other special cases.

WIC § 651 Petition may be filed in county where minor resides, county where he is found, or county where the alleged offenses took place.

WIC § 738, §§ 750-755 Provisions for transfer of case after jurisdictional finding to county, state or foreign country of minor's residence or residence of the person entitled to minor's custody. Also provisions for special orders to live in a county other than the minor's legal residence.

WIC §§ 1300-1308 Interstate Compact on Juveniles. Governs procedures for return of juvenile runaways, escapees, or absconders and for cooperative supervision of out-of-state children.